Nationals Arm Race

I’m a bit late to this post, but I thought i’d catch it up before we got too big into the 2026 draft prep.

A post-mortem to the 2025 MLB Draft is a recurring topic I write about in this space: top MLB draft picks getting drafted and turning down bonuses in order to go to college. Ever since we entered the draft pool bonus era started in 2012 (which is why this analysis starts in 2012), players not signing who were drafted in the top 10 rounds have been a relative rarity as compared to the decades prior.

2025 just passed and we saw (per the Baseball America link) the highest percentage of players signing overall in the history of the draft at 93.7%, and we still saw 2 top-10 round players refuse to sign.

This post tries to answer the question: “does it ever pay off for a player not to sign?” And I’ve added in the 2025 players for tracking and analysis going forward. Most of the older content is repeated, but is included for continuity, and if there’s an known update to older draft classes i’ve added it as necessary.

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Let’s take a look. Here’s a summary of the last 14 years of players who were drafted but did not sign from the top 10 rounds.  This analysis goes back to 2012, since that’s the beginning of the new draft bonus slot rules.

• 2025: 2
• 2024: 4
• 2023: 1
• 2022: 3
• 2021: 3 (start of the 20-round era)
• 2020: 0 (covid 5-round draft)
• 2019: 2
• 2018: 4 (all 1st or supp-1st rounders)
• 2017: 3
• 2016: 2
• 2015: 6
• 2014: 6 (two of which were Nats picks: Andrew Suarez and Austin Byler in that ill-fated draft class, and one more who didn’t sign thanks to Houston’s screwing up the Brady Aiken deal and who was eventually granted free agency).
• 2013: 8
• 2012: 8

In total, 52 total players picked in the top 10 rounds in the last 14 drafts failed to sign, more than half in the first four years of the construct as teams/players/agents were still getting used to the system. The number of players drafted in the top 10 rounds varies slightly from year to year, but its roughly 300 players a year times 14 seasons, so at least 4,200 players picked in that time and probably closer to 4,300 when you add in the dozens of supplemental and draft-compensation picks. Thus, 99% of the top 10 rounds of players generally sign, making these non-signers worth analyzing individually.

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Before we get to individual player analysis, Here’s the better question: did these players make major mistakes by NOT signing and taking the money? Well the answer is … its complicated, and it depends on many factors.

Its a common refrain among pundits in the amateur baseball world (Keith Law in particular) that HS players should “take the money” if they’re drafted high enough. Certainly any first rounder would be a fool to turn away that kind of money, and mostly any prep player offered something in the upper 6 figure range should give serious consideration.  MLB contracts generally include college tuition … so even if you sign out of HS you still have 4 years fully paid for in case you wash out.  So instead of gambling on your health, or the fickleness of the baseball draft (where one bad start can cost you 30 spots in the draft and millions of dollars), take the cash when its offered.

However, the conversation has morphed over the years as the rules have changed an college baseball has evolved. D1 programs now can offer 34 full scholarships (for years it was 12.5 so even very good players only had partial deals). Colleges have become much better at player development and a lot of the arm-thrashing behavior has been rooted from the game as journalists call out these grizzled dinosaur coaches for their behavior. Juco baseball has vastly improved so players can go there for a year and not commit to three years at a D1 program. Transfer rules are greatly relaxed, so if you head to a school and get pigeonholed on the bench or in a role you don’t like, you can just move to a better opportunity with no penalties.

And then there’s the elephant in the room: Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) considerations. Starting in 2021, colleges were free to begin offering NIL money to its athletes, but the floodgates really opened up in 2025 with the House vs NCAA settlement. Most people think NIL is just a football and basketball issue, but there’s absolutely D1 baseball programs that are cashing in (no pun intended). It’s difficult to get official numbers, but there’s rumors of the biggest programs are throwing around big enough money to impact Prep prospect decisions in the draft.

For the 2026 draft, let’s take Derek Curiel as an example: he opted out of the 2024 draft (where he was a projected as a mid-1st rounder so about a $5M bonus) to head to LSU, one of the biggest (if not THE biggest program) in the sport. He’s been added to a new “blue ribbon elite” deal and has officially disclosed merchandise deals; and most analysts put his NIL earnings at “mid-to-upper six figures.” If we assume that means $750k, he’s netted $1.5M for his two years at LSU, got some college fun-time, got a national title, and now is probably a top 5 pick, projecting to the $7M range. He’s earned 100x what he would have earned as a minor leaguer and increased his bonus value in two years. Can’t beat that.

And, if you think Curiel is an outlier, read this Baseball America story about the biggest NIL deals coaches have heard of … and most of these were transfer portal deals, of big schools (ahem, SEC schools) poaching talent from mid-majors, often for $500k deals or more. Full ride guaranteed, $500k in your pocket; why would you sign as a 5th rounder for a fraction of that if those kind of figures are out there?

LSU is not the only example here spending big money in baseball: Vanderbilt has always been a big spender on baseball, leveraging internal programs to augment its athletic scholarships for years. Tennessee, Arkansas, and Florida are all known as big spenders as well. It’s no surprise they’re all SEC teams.

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So, all that said, lets look at the empirical evidence of every player since 2012 who has forgone the cash to see if there’s any trends.

(a caveat here: I did not look at the dollar amounts in every case; this is basically draft round analysis.  Its possible that a 5th rounder in one year went in the 8th the next and got offered more money … but its quite rare with the new draft rules and bonus pools).

2025: 2 players failed to sign.

• Angel Cervantes, a prep RHP from Lynwood, California (right in the heart of Los Angeles county), who was generally ranked in the 45-50 area on draft boards. Pittsburgh drafted him right at his projection, 50th overall in the 2nd round, bonus slot of $1.93M. He failed to sign and honored his commitment to UCLA, which is just 13 miles from his home. Pittsburgh’s GM seemed aware that Cervantes may not sign when interviewed after the fact, and Pittsburgh will get a comp pick in the 2026 draft. They took that 1.93 and were able to spread some of it around to two lesser prep kids in the teens, but seemed to leave money on the table in the end. Cervantes wasn’t listed as a “strong college commit” in the scouting report at the time, and this seems like something of a shock. UCLA isn’t known as a major NIL school so it seems unlikely he’s making back $2M in three years at the school. UCLA is projecting to be a favorite to win the 2026 NCAA title, is his home town college, and Pittsburgh is not exactly a desirable franchise, all which may be factors. The Daily Bruin had a long article discussing this decision as well.
• Mason Ligenza, a prep Lefty OF from a rural Pennsylvania school, drafted in 6th round by the Dodgers with a slot value of $317k. He chose to honor his commitment to Pittsburgh instead of signing. There’s little information out there about why Ligenza made this decision; perhaps it wasn’t enough money to forgo going to college and he’s staying relatively close to home. U-Pittsburgh isn’t exactly a baseball power house, so it seems unlikely he’s vastly going to improve on his draft stock in the near term.

Verdict: too early to tell for both. Gut feeling: Cervantes ignoring $2M may be a mistake, while Ligenza’s projected bonus probably wasn’t enough to compel him to turn pro.

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2024: 4 players failed to sign.

• Tyler Bell, a prep SS from an IL HS. Drafted in 2nd-supp (#66 overall), slot value of $1.26M. Failed to come to terms with Tampa Bay. Based on some quick googling, it looks like Tampa offered him around $1.5M to sign but got other over-slot guys to sign before Bell would, which cost them the overage it likely would have taken. Bell was a top100 draft prospect and went to Kentucky and will be a draft-eligible sophomore in 2026. 2026 update: Bell is projected top 10 pick heading into the season, but suffered a shoulder injury opening day which may hamper his draft stock.
• Chris Levonas, a prep RHP from a NJ HS. Drafted one pick after Bell as a 2nd round Supp (#67). Slot value: $1.23M. He was a higher ranked prospect than Bell, and he and Milwaukee couldn’t come to terms. Per my google research, Milwaukee had $3M to offer him, but Levonas was a significant prospect and decided to honor his commitment to Wake Forest. 2026 update: Levonas was a mid-week starter for Wake in 2025, and had a sterling 2026 debut goign 6 no-hitt innings with 14Ks over Loyola Marymount. He’s at Wake til the 2027 draft.
• Ryan Prager, a college junior LHP from Texas A&M. Los Angeles picked him in the 3rd round with a slot value of $948k. Per reporting in the Athletic, Prager was pretty open with teams about being open to coming back to school, earning his degree, and seeing if he could help TAMU get back to the title game. No numbers were discussed, but it sounds like the Angels drafted him without understanding his requirements nor what it would take to sign. 2026 update: he regressed for TAMU in 2025, and he dropped to the 9th round, signing for $197k, far below his 3rd round slot the year before. Currently in the minors.
• Jaxon Jelkin, a college junior RHP from Houston. The Mets drafted him in the 9th round (slot value $196,700). There’s not a lot of information out there. MLB’s scouting report notes that he made 7 starts for Houston then blew out his UCL, requiring TJ. They also note he was “dismissed” from Nebraska’s two years ago and has “severe makeup concerns.” Reportedly NY didn’t even make him a contract offer. 2026 Update: he sat out all of 2025, did not get drafted, and is on Kentucky’s 2026 roster. He’s their Friday night starter and has dominated in his first few starts of the season. It’s still early, and as a 5th year senior he has no leverage, but he’s projecting to improve on his 2024 slot.

Conclusion: still too early to tell for Bell, Levonas, Jelkin. Prager lost money in the deal but gained a 4th year/degree hopefully.

About Levonas, I’ll say this: if you’re a prep player who gets offered $3M … you made a mistake not taking it. If indeed Levonas got that offer. Is he guaranteed to be a 1st rounder in three years?

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2023: 1: just one player out of the 314 players selected in the top 10 rounds failed to sign.

• Caden Kendle, a Jr OF from UC-Irvine taken in the 10th round by St. Louis. He apparently agreed to a $175k bonus (around 10k over slot), but then had a change of heart and decided to go back to school for his senior season.

Verdict: He refused a $175k, played another year, got drafted in the 5th round of 2024 and signed an under-slot deal for $147k. So, he lost money, and a year of pro development. He may have gained a college degree though, so that’s good.

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2022: Just three players failed to sign in the 2022 draft’s top 10 rounds.

• Nolan McLean, a draft-eligible sophomore two-way player from Oklahoma State (RHP and 3B) who was picked by the Orioles at the top of the 3rd round. Baltimore found an issue in his medicals, so McLean went back to school. Slot bonus figure: $794k. Its unclear what bonus figure they agreed upon. McLean went back to school, and was picked again in the 3rd round in 2023, dropping 10 slots and signing for $747K with the Mets.
• Brandon Sproat, a RHP sophomore from Florida, failed to sign with the Mets as a 3rd rounder (slot value $691k) for reasons unknown. He went back to school, then (amazingly) agreed to a re-draft by the Mets in 2023, who picked him in the 2nd round and signed him for $1.47M. Sproat also appears later on in this post because he refused to sign out of HS as well.
• Brock Rodden, a 2B junior from Wichita State, failed to sign as a 10th rounder with Oakland (slot value: $151.3k). He went back to school, got drafted as a 5th rounder in 2023 and signed for $200k.

Verdict: McLean was not penalized for not signing, but it wasn’t really his choice since the team reneged. Sproat more than doubled his bonus offer from last year, and Rodden improved his by likely 25%. So, all three guys “worked out” in the end.

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2021: 3 players did not sign from the top 10 rounds:

• Kumar Rocker, RHP Vanderbilt, in a well publicized blow-up, the Mets drafted Rocker 10th overall and made a huge splash announcing a $6M over-slot bonus .. then ran into issues with his medicals, resulting in the two sides failing to agree on anything and the Mets passing on the Vanderbilt star altogether.  Rocker’s agent (ahem, “advisor”) Scott Boras of course refused to make his medicals available ahead of time, and of course claimed that there was no injury, but the subsequent findings vindicated the Met’s decision. Rocker had shoulder surgery in the fall of 2021, then pitched in Indy ball in 2022 before shockingly getting drafted by the Rangers with the 3rd overall pick in 2022. He signed for $5.2M, well below the slot value, and well below the $6M he agreed to in 2021, but he was still an upper 1st rounder. He pitched in the fall league, then made a handful of starts in 2023 before …. tearing his UCL and having Tommy John. So, Perhaps the Mets were right all along.
• Jud Fabian, OF Florida; saw his draft stock fall from a possible top-5 pick all the way out of the first round.  But, he apparently had a $3M deal with Baltimore in the second, but those plans were foiled when Boston selected him at the beginning of the 2nd round.  Fabian stuck to his bonus demands, and the two sides could not reach an agreement.  Fabian went back to school and was a Comp-B pick in 2022, signing for $1.03M.
• Alex Ulloa, prep SS from Texas failed to come to terms with Houston as a 4th round pick.  Ulloa bailed out of an Oklahoma State commitment, went to Yavapai College Juco … and went undrafted in 2022 altogether. Again in 2023, but he did get a commit to U of Miami for 2024, his junior season. Failed to get drafted in 2024 altogether, now at Florida International.

Verdict: Rocker couldn’t beat $6M but still got $5.2M as damaged goods, so its hard to say he made a bad decision (not that it was entirely his to make with the Mets pulling the offer).  Fabian lost out on $2M of bonus money, but we don’t know what money he turned down from Boston (odds are he lost out on the deal). Ulloa’s slot value was $492k in 2021; we don’t know what he was offered in 2021, but we went completely undrafted in 2022, so it seems safe to say he has lost out on money.

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2020: in a shortened 5-round Covid-related draft, not one player picked in the 5 rounds failed to sign.

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2019: 2 players did not sign from the top 10 rounds

• Brandon Sproat, RHP Fla HS 7th/205 overall by Texas.  $222,100 slot value, which wasn’t enough to buy Sproat out of his commitment to Florida. As we’ve already seen, Sproat and signability was also an issue in 2022, but he did eventually sign in 2023 for a ton of money.
• Wyatt Hendrie, C from Calif Juco 10th/312 overall by Chicago Cubs.  $142,200 slot value.  Cubs seemingly ran into slot issues with both 10th and 11th rounder, and Hendrie wouldn’t take under slot. Hendrie went undrafted in 2020’s shortened draft, but then was picked in the 7th in 2021 and signed for $177,500 out of San Diego State.

Verdict: both players ended up making money by not signing; Sproat a ton, Hendrie a little bit.

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2018: 4 players did not sign

• Carter Stewart, RHP Fla HS. 1st/8th overall. Atlanta didn’t like Physical, offered 40% of slot value ($1.9M); initially slated to Mississippi State.  Update: However, he did an about face, went to a Juco instead with the plan on re-entering the 2019 draft.  When he struggled in Juco and fell to a mid 2nd round projection … he attempted an end-around of the MLB draft rules and signed to play in japan, a situation I detailed in this space.  By 2021 he had graduated the Japan minor leagues into their majors, and his stats as of 2023 seem pretty solid (as a 23yr old he has a sub 2.00 ERA for his team Softbank). 2026 update: he was dominant in 2024 but missed the entire 2025 season with injury. He’s signed in japan through 2026, at which point he may come back.
• Matt McLain: 2B Calif HS. 1st/25: Asked $3M, Arizona offered $2.6M didn’t budge, going to UCLA.  Update: picked 17th overall in the 2021 draft and signed for $4.63M. Huge gamble and huge win.
• JT Ginn: RHP Miss HS. 1st/30th: LA dodgers offered $2.4M, asking $2.9M, going to Mississippi State.  Update: drafted 2nd round/52nd overall in 2020 draft, signed for $2.9M with the Mets in a well over-slot deal.  So two years later he got his asking number.
• Gunnar Hoglund: LHP Fla HS. 1supp/36: Pittsburgh didn’t like physical, low-balled and he declined. going to Ole Miss.  2021; was projected as a top 10 pick, hurt his arm, had TJ but still got drafted 19th overall by Toronto and signed for $3.25M. Big win.

McLean drastically improved his stock, Ginn got what he wanted, and Hoglund (despite his injury) got paid.  I already detailed why I think Stewart’s deal is smart.

Verdict: All four made the right decision.

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2017: 3 players did not sign

• Drew Rasmussen, RHP, Oregon State, 1s/31st overall. Failed to sign with Tampa, who (I guess) didn’t like his medicals.  He was coming back from TJ and only had a few weeks of action before the draft. Update: Went 6th round in 2018 to Milwaukee.
• Jack Conlon, RHP, Clements HS (Sugar Land, Texas). 4th round/128 overall. Failed to sign with Baltimore, went to Texas A&M.  Update: left TAMU, went to San Jacinto, then enrolled in Rice and sat out 2020.  However, he wasn’t on the 2021 roster, and its unclear where he’s playing at this point. He seems to be out of baseball at this point.
• Jo Jo Booker, RHP, Miller HS (Brewton, Ala.). 5th round/145 overall. failed to sign with LA Angels, went to South Alabama.  Ended up playing 5 full seasons for South Alabama, was never drafted, posted an ERA north of 6.00 his 5th year, and is likely out of baseball.

Two players who ended up playing themselves out of any bonus dollars.  Rasmussen didn’t turn down the Rays as much as they refused to tender him a contract … they must have tendered him something because they got a comp pick in 2018 draft.  So he turned down 40% of first round money in 2017 to sign an under-slot deal in the 6th round of 2018 ($135k, just $10k more than the non-top 10 rounds minimum).  I’d say this was a bad move by the player unless Tampa flat out refused to pay a dollar.

Verdict: 1 worsened his draft position, 2 missed out on any draft money.

2016: 2 players did not sign

• Nick Lodolo: 1S/41st overall; LHP from Damien HS in California. failed to sign with Pittsburgh, went to TCU instead, draft eligible in 2019.  In 2021, drafted 7th overall, signed for $5.43M.
• Tyler Buffett: 7th/217 overall; RHP, failed to sign with Houston. returned to Oklahoma State, drafted in 6th round in 2017 and signed with Cincinnati

Lodolo went to school (an arm-shredder program in TCU even) and went from 41st overall to 7th overall, with probably 3x the bonus.  Furthermore, by 2021 he was one of the best pitching prospects in the game.  Meanwhile Buffett improved his draft position one round by going back to school.

Verdict: 1 drastically improved his draft pick and money, 1 improved his draft position one round.

2015: 6 guys did not sign.

• Kyle Funkhouser: 1st/35th overall: RHP from Louisville, failed to sign with LA Dodgers, turning down an above-slot $2M. 4th rounder in 2016, signed with Detroit.
• Brady Singer, 2nd/56th overall: RHP Florida HS. failed to sign with Toronto, went to Florida and was 1st rounder in 2018, signed with Kansas City
• Jonathan Hughes, 2nd/68th overall: RHP Georgia HS. failed to sign with Baltimore, went to Georgia Tech and not even drafted in 2018…
• Kyle Cody, 2nd/73rd overall: RHP U Kentucky. failed to sign with Minnesota, drafted in 6th round in 2016 and signed with Texas
• Nicholas Shumpert, 7th/220th overall. SS Colorado HS. failed to sign with Detroit. Went to San Jacinto CC, drafted in 28th round 2016 by Atlanta and signed.
• Kep Brown, 10th/311 overall. RF South Carolina HS, failed to sign with LA Dodgers. went to Juco, then to UNC-Wilmington, not drafted in 2018.

Funkhouser was the biggest “whoops” here; a poor spring took him from his pre-season top 10 draft position all the way out of the first round, but he still demanded upper 1st round money.  He didn’t get it … and then fell to the 4th round the next year.  That was a big fail.  Singer clearly improved on his 2nd round status by going to college.    Cody slipped from being a 2nd rounder to a 6th rounder.  The other three guys drastically fell on draft boards; one of them going from a 10th rounder to not even being drafted.

Verdict: 1 improved, 5 hurt draft stock

2014: 6 failed to sign

• Brady Aiken: 1/1 overall, RHP from San Diego HS. failed to sign with Houston, went to IMG Academy in FL, drafted 1/17 by Cleveland
• Andrew Suarez: 2nd/57 overall LHP from U-Miami, failed to sign with Washington. Drafted 2nd round/61st overall in 2015 by San Francisco
• Trevor Megill; 3rd/104th overall RHP from Loyola Marymount. failed to sign with Boston, drafted 7th/207 in 2015 draft and signed with San Diego
• Jacob Nix: 5th/136 RHP from Los Alomitos HS; couldn’t sign when Tampa lost bonus money, sued, FA, signed with San Diego
• Zack Zehner: 7th/204 OF from Cal Poly, failed to sign with Toronto. Drafted 18th round 2015 and signed with NYY
• Austin Byler, 9th/274 1B from nevada-Reno. failed to sign with Washington, drafted 11th round in 2015 and signed with Arizona

Aiken became quite the rarity; the first #1 overall baseball pick to fail to sign in 30  years.    But his lack of signing cascaded and cost the Astros both their 5th rounder Nix and another player later on thanks to the new draft rules on bonus pools; Nix ended up being declared a FA in a face-saving move by MLB so as not to admit that their new bonus cap circumvention rules were BS.  Aiken had no where to go but down from 1-1 so he obviously cost himself money.  The others all fell, if only slightly in Suarez’s case.

Verdict: 1 didn’t count, 5 lowered draft stock

2013: 8 failed to sign

• Phil Bickford: 1/10 RHP California HS. Toronto failed to sign. went to Southern Nevada juco, drafted 1/18 by SF and signed.
• Matt Krook 1s/35 LHP calif HS. Miami failed to sign, went to Oregon State, drafted 4th round by SF in 2016
• Ben DeLuzio 3rd/80 SS from Fla HS. Miami failed to sign. Went to Florida State, played 4 years … undrafted out of college, NDFA with Arizona
• Ben Holmes, 5th /151 LHP Oregon State. Philly failed to sign. went 9th round in 2014
• Jason Monda 6th/181 OF Washington State. Philly failed to sign … then accused him of NCAA violations. he wasn’t drafted again and quit to go to Med school
• Stephen Woods 6th/188 RHP NY HS: Tampa failed to sign, went to Suny-Albany, drafted 8th round 2016 by SF and signed
• Dustin DeMuth 8th/230 3B from Indiana, Minnesota failed to sign, became 5th rounder in 2014 and signed with Milwaukee
• Ross Kivett 10th/291 2B from kansas State. Cleveland failed to sign, became 6th rounder in 2014 and signed with Detroit

Bickford fell 8 slots year over  year but still fell.   DeMuth and Kivett both improved their stock.  The rest fell, drastically in some cases.

Verdict: 2 improved, 6 fell

2012: 8 failed to sign

• Mark Appel 1/8 RHP Stanford by Pittsburgh. failed to sign, was 1/1 in 2013 with Houston
• Teddy Stankiewicz 2/75 RHP from Texas Hs. failed to sign with Mets, went Juco, 2/45 in 2013 by Boston
• Alec Rash, 2/95 by Philadelphia from IA HS. went to Missouri, 2015 drafted in 23rd round by Washington but still didn’t sign; quit baseball and started playing NCAA basketball
• Kyle Twomey, 3/106 LHP Calif HS Oakland. Drafted 13th round 3 yrs later out of USC by Chicago Cubs.
• Brandon Thomas 4/136 OF from Ga Tech; didn’t sign with Pittsburgh, drafted 8th round one year later and signed with NYY
• Colin Poche 5/162 LHP texas h s. failed to sign with Baltimore, went to Dallas Baptist, undrafted Jr year, drafted 14th round 2016 by Arizona
• Nick Halamandaris 8/251 1B Calif HS. failed to sign with Seattle, played 4 years at cal, undrafted jr and Sr year, NDFA with Seattle, played one season
• L.J. Mazzilli 9/280 2B from UConn. 4th rounder in 2013 signed with NY Mets

Appel managed to improve from 8th overall to 1st overall.  Stankiewicz also improved his stock about a round’s worth.  Mazzilli improved from a 9th rounder to a 4th rounder.  The others all fell.

Verdict: 3 up, 5 down.

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Summary: of the 52 players who failed to sign, passing judgement even on the players where its far too early to really tell (below figures now updated to the 2025 draft):

• 31 hurt their draft stock by failing to sign (15 HS, 16 coll)
• 15 improved their draft stock/money
• 1 didn’t really count b/c of the Houston 2014 draft bonus shenanigans (Jacob Nix, HS)
• 5 from 2024/2025 too early yet to tell.

So, 2 out of every 3 times a kid turns down the money they’re costing themselves in the long run. But, its also worth noting that a huge percentage of these players who declined to sign were at the very beginning of the new rules … in the last few years, the success rate of players has gone way up. I attribute it to players now understanding better the rules of the system.

Food for thought.

One of the last 2 remaining “big pundits” in the space released their top 30 today, as Sam Dykstra, Jim Callis, and Jonathan Mayo put pen to paper and released our Nats top 30 list.

Links to past major pundits include: Keith Law, Baseball America, Prospects1500. Others just do top 10s or are behind firewalls. One last big one remains: Fangraphs, who is churning them out now team by team.

Here’s the top 30 in tabular format

MLBPipeline rank	First Name	Last Name	Position
1	Eli	Willits	SS
2	Travis	Sykora	RHP (Starter)
3	Harry	Ford	C
4	Jarlin	Susana	RHP (Starter)
5	Gavin	Fein	SS
6	Luis	Perales	RHP (Starter)
7	Seaver	King	SS
8	Luke	Dickerson	SS/CF
9	Devin	Fitz-Gerald	SS
10	Landon	Harmon	RHP (Starter)
11	Alex	Clemmey	LHP (Starter)
12	Ethan	Petry	1B/OF (Corner)
13	Yoel	Tejeda Jr.	RHP (Starter)
14	Jackson	Kent	LHP (Starter)
15	Alejandro	Rosario	RHP
16	Miguel	Sime Jr.	RHP (Starter)
17	Coy	James	SS
18	Christian	Franklin	OF (CF)
19	Andrew	Pinckney	OF (Corner)
20	Yeremy	Cabrera	OF (corner)
21	Marconi	German	SS
22	Sam	Peterson	OF (CF)
23	Angel	Feliz	SS/3B
24	Abimelec	Ortiz	1B/OF (Corner)
25	Ronny	Cruz	SS
26	Eriq	Swan	RHP (Starter)
27	Sean Paul	Linan	RHP (Starter)
28	Caleb	Lomavita	C
29	Yohandy	Morales	3B
30	Nauris	De La Cruz	OF (Corner)

Thoughts.

• We seem to have settled on a “Big 5” in the system, with nearly every pundit having the same 5 guys at the top in some order. Willits has separated himself as #1.
• This is the highest i’ve seen Sykora kept with his TJ surgery amongst rating systems, which implies that he’d be #1 over Willits if he was healthy. That’s probably not saying anything ground breaking.
• The next 4 guys: all trade bounty. Our entire top 20 now is Draft or Trade acquisitions; you have to go down to #21 to find the first IFA in German Marconi. Hopefully the new regime has a plan to return our relatively disastrous IFA system into something that generates talent.
• They have King and Dickerson 7 and 8. I think that’s still high for both, but its inline with where others have them. I understand the narrative, especially surrounding King, but Dickerson didn’t have the benefit of an AFL season where he raked to remind people of his potential.
• Remember what I said previously about ranking Prep RHP with big bonuses? Harmon: #10. Yup, right where I said he’d be.
• They’re a little low on Clemmey … he’s 2 years out of HS, and spent those two years moving up 3 levels of the minor leagues. Why would anyone rank him below a kid we just drafted who’s pitched exactly zero pro innings? Remember; had he gone to college Clemmey would be a College Junior right now just starting his draft-year season … for us he’ll be the opening day starter in AA where he’s already got a month of experience.
• Just like Keith Law, they’re incredibly high on Tejeda, ranking him #13. wow. Reading his scouting report, they’re putting the 6’8″ starter at mid 90s, which plays up with his height, with 2 decent secondary pitches and a 60 grade on his slider. They say 4th or 5th starter ceiling. Can’t wait to see what he does in 2026.
• They’re also pretty high on Jackson Kent, noting his 18 K/BB ratio but only giving him a 50 for his control (weird). Another guy who’ll be in AA in 2026. Can’t wait to see this crew run through Richmond (June 9th-14th) to get a look at some of them.
• Ironic they have Franklin and Pinckney ranked right next to each other: they’re basically the same prospect at this point. AAA Outfielders with some pop.
• They’re not fans of Sam Peterson, top 10 on other lists but at #22 here. They say 4th OF.
• Lomavita all the way down at #28; that seems way too low. Then again, Law didn’t have him in his top 20 nor in his Honorable Mentions, so maybe the shine is off of him, especially since Ford is now the heir-apparent
• Morales gets dumped even further; man this guy is just not respected by these shops for getting to AAA at age 23 and holding his own.

Outside the top 30 guys include

• Any 2026 IFA signing
• Kevin Bazzell; he’ll need a productive season to get back
• Sir Jamison Jones; Law loves him at #14
• Jorgelys Mota; maybe a solid High-A season will help.

Nobody else of note: MLBpipeline does a pretty conservative list.

Here’s an early check-in for the top of the 2026 draft class. We first published a look right after the 2026 MLB draft order was determined and the Nats settled into the #11 spot, so we may not have a shot at the very top names here, but it’s likely one of these guys may be who we end up with at #11.

I’ll split the players into college and prep, and delineate between players who have consistently been in the early 1-1 talk versus those who have fallen out of the discussions.

Our new regime does not seem to be scared of picking Prep players, so unlike in year’s past I’m going to have to focus more on the prep guys. And, there’s significant news on that front, as one of the best Prep kids in the 2027 HS class just reclassified to 2026, putting another intriguing name out there. Read more about him in the Prep section.

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College Upper 1st round names in the mix for 1-1

• Roch Cholowsky, SS, UCLA. D1-AA 2025 as Soph. BA’s College POTY in 2025 as a Sophomore, clear 1-1 candidate in early 2026 draft considerations. Only 60-grade guy on the board from ProspectsLive. #1 on MLBpipeline’s first list, called consensus 1-1. D1 pre-season AA. He’s certainly hit the 2026 season running: through his first 7 games he’s slashing .393/.486/1.143 with 6 homers and a fantastical 1.626 OPS figure. Two of those homers came against TCU’s ace in the big top-10 matchup last weekend, so it’s not like he’s padding his stats against mid-week guys.
• Cameron Flukey, RHP Coastal Carolina. D1 3rd team AA 2025 as Soph, Fri starter for CCU CWS team. 2nd best arm in pitching-weak draft class. D1 pre-season AA. BA has him #3 in Feb 2026
• Jackson Flora, RHP, UC Santa Barbara: helium guy early 2026 spring, BA has him top 5.
• Justin Lebron, SS, Alabama: .316/.421/.636 line with 18 home runs and 17 stolen bases in 2025. #3 on MLBP’s first board. D1 pre-season AA 2nd team (1st team was Cholowsky).

College Candidates who have fallen out of  1-1 contention

I like this section, because many of these names are going to be there at #11 overall if the draft board falls our way.

• Drew Burress, CF, Georgia Tech. D1-AA 2025 as Soph. #2 on ProspectsLive Sept2025 board, undersized 5’9″ but good EV, lefty, fast. Slight concerns on CF vs Corner. Some disagreement in the industry on rank; some have top 10, others further down. D1 pre-season AA.
• Liam Peterson, RHP, Florida; leading college Arm of the class. 6’5″ upper 90s. 2x Team USA pitcher. Up to #4 on BA’s list Oct2025, but #13 on MLBpipeline’s list. Did not make D1 pre-season AA at any level; curious. Struck out 12 in his 2026 debut.
• Derek Curiel, OF, LSU:  .345/.470/.519 as starting Freshman/lead off hitter in 2025, draft-eligible as Sophomore in 2026. Playing CF for LSU in 2026, should stay there as long/lanky 6’2 180 guy. power limited, but great hit tool. D1 pre-season AA.
• AJ Gracia, OF (corner) UVA via duke: big corner-bopper bat profile, transferring to UVA from Duke with their new coach, starting to get top-5 buzz. D1 pre-season AA
• Chris Hacopian, SS, Texas A&M; 3B in the pros, 6’1″ some defensive questions but big bat.
• Daniel Cuvet, 3B, Miami. D1-AA 2025 as Soph. D1 pre-season AA.
• Evan Dempsey, 2-way FGCU: D1-AA 2025 as Soph. D1 pre-season AA.
• Lucas Moore, OF, Louisville: D1-2nd team AA 2025 as Soph
• Ryder Helfrick, C, Arkansas. D1 pre-season AA. .305/.420/.616 as a Sophmore.

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High School Upper 1st round names in the mix for 1-1

• Grady Emerson, SS, Argyle HS (TX). Texas commit. BA’s #1 ranked HS 2026 draft prospect in 2025. U18 USA baseball team 2025. Remains top HS prep player in MLBPipeline’s first rankings. BA’s #2 overall player Feb2026
• Jacob Lombard, SS, Gulliver Prep HS (FL); UMiami commit, big baseball factory HS. Projected top 10, rising. BA has him #6 in Feb2026.
• Tyler Spangler, SS, De La Salle HS, Concord (CA): Stanford commit, 6’3″ free swinger, may move to 3B, solid defender. Up to #3 on BA’s oct2025 board, down to #10 on BA’s board Feb2026.
• Jared Grindlinger, LHP, Huntington Beach HS (CA). Was the #3 player in the 2027 class, reclassified in mid February 2026 to the 2026 class and is now immediately in the upper 1st round conversation. As of this writing he’s yet to even turn 17 … which means he’s going to be incredibly young for the class, even with the reclassification, and this kind of youth really plays in some analytics models. At current; he’s 6’3″ 185, can hit 96 from the left hand side. He’s been on every UXX National team since he was 12.

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High School guys whose stock has fallen:

• Kevin Roberts, RHP/OF Jackson Prep (FL): same HS as Konnor Griffen, huge guy 6’5″ Florida commit, primarily hitter but can hit 94-95 on mound as well.
• Rocco Maniscalco SS/2B (Oxford, Ala., HS). Reclassified to 2026, won’t turn 17 until May 2025, super young.
• Tyler Spangler, SS, De La Salle HS, Concord, Calif.
• Brady Harris, a prep OF from Jacksonville committed to Florida who is a power-hitting plus defender

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sources:

• D1Baseball 2025 All Americans June 2025
• CBSsports/RJ Anderson Names to Know at top 2026 draft candidates 7/15/25
• BA’s first 2026 mock draft, July 2025.
• BA’s 2026 Top 100 Draft Board as of July 2025.
• ProspectsLive Sept 2025 Top college guys
• USA Baseball U18 roster for 2025
• ProspectsLive Oct 2025 Top College guys.
• BA’s Oct2025 top 100 Updates
• MLB Pipeline’s Dec 2025 top 100 draft candidates
• D1Baseball 2026 pre-season AA post
• BA’s Feb 2026 Top 200 Draft Prospects

Just as spring training started, the final Qualifying-offer Attached Free Agent still on the market (Zac Gallen) finally signed, completing this year’s slate of QO-attached players.

As I’ve done in the past, let’s take a quick peek at the system and the players that tested it this year, talk about the impact the signings will have on the 2026 draft, and opine in general about how short sighted the entire system continues to be.

Here’s a quick overview of the 13 players who took Qualifying Offers this past off-season and what happened:

Year	Player	Old Team	New Team	Draft Pick Forfeited	Signing Date	New Contract	AAV change	Q.O. Screw the player?
2025	Kyle Tucker	Chicago Cubs	Los Angeles Dodgers	3-108, 4-138	1/15/2026	4yr/$240M	37.795	No
2025	Bo Bichette	Toronto Blue Jays	New York Mets	none	1/16/2026	3yr/$126M	19.795	No
2025	Framber Valdez	Houston Astros	Detroit	2-69	2/6/2026	3yr/$115M	16.125	No
2025	Kyle Schwarber	Philadelphia Phillies	Philadelphia Phillies	n/a	12/9/2025	5yrs/$150M	7.795	No
2025	Shota Imanaga	Chicago Cubs	Chicago Cubs	n/a	11/18/2025	1yr/$22.205M	8.955	No
2025	Ranger Suarez	Philadelphia Phillies	Boston Red Sox	2-62, 5-0159	1/14/2026	5yr/$130M	3.795	No
2025	Dylan Cease	San Diego Padres	Toronto	2-73, 5-178	11/26/2025	7yr/$210M (with deferrals)	7.795	No
2025	Edwin Diaz	New York Mets	Los Angeles Dodgers	2-74, 5-179	12/9/2025	3yr/$69M	0.795	No
2025	Trent Grisham	New York Yankees	New York Yankees	n/a	11/18/2025	1yr/$22.205M (with deferrals)	17.205	No
2025	Michael King	San Diego Padres	San Diego Padres	n/a	12/19/2025	3yr/$75M	2.795	No
2025	Zac Gellen	Arizona Diamondbacks	Arizona Diamondbacks	n/a	2/13/2016	1yr/$22.205M	0	Sort of
2025	Brandon Woodruff	Milwaukee Brewers	Milwaukee Brewers	n/a	11/1/2025	1yr/$22.205M	13.455	No
2025	Gleyber Torres	Detroit Tigers	Detroit Tigers	n/a	11/1/2025	1yr/$22.205M	7.205	No

The 2025 QO class differed from many of the previous classes in that many ended up resigning with their original team. Of the 13 who filed initially:

• 4 took the QO
• Another 3 resigned with their original teams.

Of the remaining 6 players who did move teams and burn draft picks, for the most part they signed massive deals. Tucker: $60M aav. Bichette? $42M AAV. Valdez? $38M AAV. Schwarber signed a 5yr $150M deal to be an aging DH in Philly.

So, I ask you. Who is this system protecting, exactly? Every one of the 13 guys who filed signed for an AAV of at least the QO offer itself, and there’s only one of the 13 players who you can legitimately say was ‘screwed” by the QO this off season (Zac Gellen, who ended up returning to his original team and signed for the QO figure, albeit with deferrals).

Some of the players getting offered QOs were just stupid: Trent Grisham had a walk-year AAV of just $5M; he probably couldn’t wait to sign the QO at $22M to more than quadruple his salary to stay with the same team, and thus enter FA next season completely unrestricted. Same with Brandon Woodruff; he increased his year over year salary by $13M with this little one-year QO pillow contract.

Meanwhile, big market teams made a mockery of the system. The Dodgers signed two QO attached players and thus forfeited their 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th highest draft picks. Other teams who didn’t seem to care about the picks lost? The Mets, Boston, Toronto, and Detroit; basically three of the biggest spenders in the game plus a Detroit team who knows full well this is a make-or-break season with Skubal going into his final season.

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All in all, 11 draft picks were forfeited by the various teams, which countered a few comp picks but which definitely will result in the Nats getting cracks at slightly better players than they would have otherwise. The Nats ended up gaining a few slots in their 3rd round and higher thanks to forfeited 2nd rounders, and move up a bit more in the 5th an beyond as well. Will drafting 77th overall in the 2nd make a difference versus drafting 81st? Perhaps. Not as much as if we had retained 3rd overall, but those are the breaks.

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All that said, I just have to say… what are we doing here?

I understand the original concept of the QO system and what it tried to fix. If you remember, there used to be “Class A” and “Class B” free agents that would cost their signing teams higher or lower draft picks depending on their value (Class A picks would cost a team its 1st round draft pick, as the Nats did a number of times (we gave up a 17th overall pick in 2016 to sign Daniel Murphy, we gave up a 30th overall pick to sign Max Scherzer in 2015, and the one that continues to get me, we gave up 28th rounder in 2013 to sign Rafael Soriano). The main problem with this A/B system was that certain types of players (mainly decent relievers) would get tagged with a Class A label, and no team wanted to give up a 1st rounder for a middle reliever.

However. What this system does now is basically “protect” a very, very small class of players who mostly don’t need protecting. Kyle Tucker was always going to sign for a massive amount of money; he didn’t need “protection” from a Qualifying Offer. Nor did most of the players in this system this year.

I think this system exposes a pretty severe flaw in the MLBPA’s general approach to labor issues. As a union, they focus way, way too much on the issues facing its veterans and not nearly enough on its younger players. The guy about to sign a 9-figure deal who has opt outs and hotel suites negotiated into his contract doesn’t need Union protection; its the 6year player getting taken to arbitration over $100k who has one shot at a decent FA contract.

In the last CBA negotiations, the Union used the QO system more as a bargaining chip than something it really wanted. MLB owners want an international draft and pinned that to the QO system. The union, even as short sighted as it sometimes appears, does know that an international draft has a likely severe impact on Latin American markets (just as baseball managed to kill baseball development in Puerto Rico), so we continue to have the system today. Is the draft pick penalty enough? Apparently not when the smartest team in the sport (The Dodgers) willfully blow their entire 2026 draft to sign two marquee FAs with QOs attached.

I dunno. I sense we’re in for a long off-season of labor issues anyway, having nothing to do with the QO and having everything to do with revenue sharing, salary caps, and RSN collapses. I’m not sure this QO system is going to be a priority to fix. But if the Union can trade QOs for maybe getting to FA a year earlier or more realistic salaries in arbitration, maybe its worth pursuing.

Just a quick PSA; Mark Zuckerman, who’s covered the Nats since Day 1 via several different outlets, is back out on his own after MASN cut him loose last month.

He’s now trying the same thing this year that he did in 2009; a subscriber-based model for his coverage. He’s fired back up the old natsjournal.com site, with a substack affiliation, and he’s heading to Palm Beach to cover spring training.

Here’s his organizational post. In the wake of MASN cutting loose its beat reporters and now the Washington Post gutting/eliminating its sports department … there’s precious little Nats coverage in the industry.

I have no affiliation with Zuckerman, but I have always liked his stuff. I just subscribed to his feed to help support him, and I’d encourage you to do the same. I think the loss of Zuckerman would be a huge blow to Nats journalism and hope he can continue. I hope you consider doing the same.

The next big pundit to drop his Nats prospect rankings hit today, as the Athletic’s Keith Law released his NL East teams, including a top 20 for Washington this morning.

As far as major pundits go: we’ve now gotten (links open to my analysis here if done) Keith Law, Baseball America, Prospects1500, Prospects361 (just a top 10 back in November), Baseball Prospectus (paywall), and ProspectsLive (mostly paywall protected) released. Still waiting for MLBpipeline, hopefully more than just a top 10 from ESPN/McDaniel, and the Fangraphs guys (who wait til June usually). Once we get the MLB and larger ESPN links, I’ll re-release my own rankings, which I put out a draft of at the end of 2025.

Law is known to be a bit contrarian in his farm system and prospect rankings; so far his system rankings are showing at least 4-5 outliers as compared to the rest of the field (including his ranking the Nats 6th overall, when most other pundits so far have us middle of the road in the 15-16 range). I think these outliers result in his methodology, which has him “start over” on prospects every year and he tries not to let previous years color his evaluations. I suspect this leads him to over- and under- evaluation of players who had one-off seasons one way or the other. We’ll see how that plays out during the analysis.

So, with that in mind, here’s his top 20 for the Nats.

Current Rank	First Name	Last Name	Position
1	Eli	Willits	SS
2	Gavin	Fein	SS
3	Seaver	King	SS
4	Travis	Sykora	RHP (Starter)
5	Harry	Ford	C
6	Jarlin	Susana	RHP (Starter)
7	Luke	Dickerson	SS/CF
8	Sam	Peterson	OF (CF)
9	Luis	Perales	RHP (Starter)
10	Alex	Clemmey	LHP (Starter)
11	Landon	Harmon	RHP (Starter)
12	Devin	Fitz-Gerald	SS
13	Ethan	Petry	1B/OF (Corner)
14	Sir Jamison	Jones	C
15	Yoel	Tejeda Jr.	RHP (Starter)
16	Abimelec	Ortiz	1B/OF (Corner)
17	Coy	James	SS
18	Yeremy	Cabrera	OF (corner)
19	Sean Paul	Linan	RHP (Starter)
20	Caleb	Lomavita	C
21	Kevin	Bazzell	C
22	Miguel	Sime Jr.	RHP (Starter)
23	Alejandro	Rosario	RHP
24	Christian	Franklin	OF (CF)

Here’s some thoughts going top to bottom.

• He may be contrarian, but he’s not THAT contrarian, keeping Willits at #1.
• Fien comes in at #2, in a bit of a surprise. He called Fien “the best HS hitter in the 2025 draft” and has high hopes. So do we, Keith, so do we. The more I look at the Gore trade, the more it looks like Gore for Fien plus a bunch of lottery tickets.
• King all the way at #3. Easily the high mark for King this cycle. Law had King #2 this time last year, so he’s always liked him. He mentioned the “conflicting advice” King got last year as the reason behind his hitting troubles, something we’ve heard from multiple sources and something that Law attributes to several inexplicable hitting performances for King, Bazzell, and Dickerson last year. He was very bullish on King’s AFL performance, and also reminds us just how good he is defensively.
• Sykora, Ford, Susana come in 4-5-6 whereas most of the shops we’ve seen have them ranked 2-3-4. Fair enough. Law has never been a fan of “100mph guy who walks 4 per nine” and that describes Susana (and Perales) to a T.
• Peterson at #8, another high mark for the prospect. If we can turn an 8th rounder into a MLB regular, that’s a huge farm system win.
• Something else Law doesn’t like is weird pitching mechanics, which explains why Clemmey is down at #10 when he’s mostly in the 5-6 range elsewhere.
• He has 100mph capable Landon Harmon at #11, which is amazing considering where he lands on every other ranking right now (11-11-13-9-10-11-7-10-10-10-11-6-10-13 since drafted). It’s almost like the entire industry says, “Ok … prep RHP who throws 100mph at age 18 … got a huge bonus … he could be Justin Verlander or he could be … um… one of 1000 prep RHPs who never get out of low-A. Lets rank him #10.” Guess where I ranked him last Fall? #10! Where am I gonna rank him in a couple weeks? #10! Ok, Maybe.
• He’s got Fitz-Gerald a bit lower than others, probably b/c he’s a bit undersized and has 2B ceiling all over him.
• He’s super high on Sir Jamison Jones at #14, kind of a forgotten prep draftee from 2024 who took a bit more than the $150k min to sign surprisingly. Hey, if Law’s right here, all the better.
• Also super high on Tejeda, kind of a RHP slinger who couldn’t get into the weekend rotation at Florida State but who pitched a-OK in low A for us.
• I like that he recognizes the MLB playing potential for Abimelec Ortiz, who BA didn’t even have in their top 30. This guy could be in our MLB opening day lineup at 1B.
• He had interesting comments on both Linan and Swan, the two arms we got for Alex Call out of the Dodgers’ stacked farm system. He still ranks Linan #19 but lists his ceiling as a “trick-pitch reliever.” Not promising. He describes Swan as having a “golden arm who can’t throw strikes or miss bats,” another indictment.
• The list is bottomed up by Lomavita, who is #20 here but mostly in the upper teens elsewhere. Not a flattering look at his receiving.

He lists a few Honorable mentions that i’ve ranked “21-24: Bazzell, Sime, Rosario, and Franklin.

Who’s he missing?

• The highest likely player he doesn’t rank that others routinely have in their top 20s is Angel Feliz. Could be b/c Law didn’t spend a ton of time in the FCL and wasn’t impressed with his 2 months in Low-A.
• He seems almost unfairly down on Yohandy Morales … who he says has too much swing and miss as a 23-yr old in AAA. Yeah, a 23-yr old in AAA. Not a 26-yr old in AAA. Lots of 2023 draftees are still in A ball, not starting in AAA a full season. Should be higher.
• Perhaps that’s also why Andrew Pinckney is nowhere to be found; anything you can say about Morales you can probably say about Pinckney right now too.
• Not too many others that he left out: Jackson Kent maybe in the edges of his top 20. No Phillip Glasser, he with the NRI now for 2026 spring training. No recognition of Cornelio’s 2025 season. But we’re now nitpicking, because its likely most of these guys would be in his 21-30 range.

For most of this century, Regional Sports Networks (or, “RSN” as used throughout) became a massive revenue generator for MLB teams, as they recognized that they could fetch tens of millions of dollars (or more) from their local cable providers to show games in their home market.

However, the last few years have seen a massive acceleration of “cord cutting,” as a new generation of TV consumers has eschewed conventional cable packages in favor of streaming options, thanks to the rise of smart TVs, fast internet, the reliability of tools like Roku, etc. This isn’t a groundbreaking statement (duh Captain Obvious), just putting it there to set the stage for what comes next.

This almost immediately led to some of the weaker RSN markets encountering financial difficulties, which in 2023 started to lead to major changes in the marketplace. And, in the last few weeks, we’ve seen an acceleration of these actions that now have nearly half the league without RSN deals. Here’s some of the salient inflection points over the past 3 years:

• Diamond Sports Group: was the first domino to fall in 2023, declaring Chapter 11 and failing to pay multiple teams its RSN fees, leading them to sever ties and have MLB pick them up. This included San Diego, Arizona at first in 2023, then Colorado, Cleveland, and Minnesota in 2024.
• In Late 2025, Seattle decided to exit the RSN market (they owned their own RSN) and joined up with MLB. That made them the 6th team to join MLB’s umbrella. As we will see, this turned out to be kind of a shocking issue in that Seattle was a 9-figure market AND owned the RSN, but they had what most call a pretty poorly-negotiated contract locally.
• Soon after, in Jan 2026 the MASN-Washington Nationals parting was announced, making the Nats the 7th team in the MLB portfolio.
• Main Street Sports: the Diamond group emerged from bankruptcy in early 2025, rebranded, and tried to continue its operations, then partnered with FanDuel Sports Network. However, in early 2026, they missed payments to a slew of teams, who all bailed and went to MLB. This included: Cincinnati, Kansas City, Miami, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Tampa. Now this makes for 13 teams in the MLB network.
• FanDuel Sports also had rights to Atlanta, Los Angeles Angels, and Detroit last year; they remain up in the air for 2026 as of this writing and could very well all join MLB as well, making it possibly 16 of the 30 teams for 2026.
• Interestingly, Texas Rangers were also embroiled in the Diamond Sports Group issue, but launched their own RSN in 2025 and are there for the time being.

(A quick Tangent: A side effect of the MASN termination, by the way, is bittersweet: Mark Zuckerman was let go. Here’s his MASN farewell post, This is not the first time he’s had to find new work, having been axed by the Washington Times in 2009 when they ended all their sports operations, then depending on donations and individual contributions to self-finance his 2010 spring training coverage. He initially covered the team at a Blogspot site, then fired up NatsInsider.com for a bit before landing at Comcast Sports Net for a few years, getting axed there and joining MASN for the last decade. He’s covered the Nats since Day 1 and I certainly hope he picks up with a media outlet that continues to allow him to cover the team, whether its MLB.tv, or as MLB’s beat reporter covering the team, or perhaps whatever local cable shop ends up buying the MLB.tv Nats stream (Monument?). Nonetheless, He’s too valuable a resource in the community to have this be it.)

So, now with nearly half the league with MLB, what does the landscape of RSNs look like? I’m going to order the list below roughly by the current or immediate previous RSN revenues to illustrate a specific point, which will become clear soon enough. I’ve also included a very-old 2012 overview of known RSN Deals at the time, some of which are still valid and a much more updated 2024 version at MLBtraderumors.com.

Market DMA Rank	Revenue Rank	Team	RSN	Team Owned?	Est Revenues (2022 latest)
2	1	Los Angeles Dodgers	Spectrum SportsNet LA	Yes	$196M
1	2	New York Yankees	YES Network	Yes	$143M
4	3	Philadelphia	NBC Sports Philadelphia	No	$125M
2	4	Los Angeles Angels	In Flux: was Fan Duel	No	Was $125M
5	5	Texas Rangers	Rangers Sports Network	Yes	was $111M
10	6	Atlanta Braves	In Flux: was Fan Duel	No	$100M
7a	7	Toronto Blue Jays	SportsNet	Yes	Unreported
13	8	Seattle Mariners	MLB.tv	No	was $100M
3	9	Chicago Cubs	Marquee Sports Network	Yes	$99M
9	10	Boston Red Sox	New England Sports Network	Yes	$97M
8	11	San Francisco Giants	NBC Sports Bay Area	Yes	$92M
1	12	New York Mets	SportsNet New York	No?	$88M
7	13	Houston Astros	Space City Home Network	Yes	$73M but now ?
21	14	St. Louis	MLB.tv	No	was $73M
8	15	Nomad Athletics	None?	No	was $70m Believe nothing til move to LV
12	16	Arizona Diamondbacks	MLB.tv	No	was $68M
6	17	Washington Nationals	MLB.tv	No	Was $64M
26	18	Baltimore	MASN	Yes	$64M
3	19	Chicago White Sox	NBC Sports Chicago	No?	$60M
14	20	Detroit	In Flux: was Fan Duel	No	was $60M
24	21	Pittsburgh	SportsNet Pittsburgh	Yes	$55-$60M
35	22	Cincinnati	MLB.tv	No	was $60M
17	23	Denver	MLB.tv	No	was $57M
11	24	Tampa Bay Rays	MLB.tv	No	was $56M
19	25	Cleveland	MLB.tv	No	was $55M
15	26	Minnesota Twins	MLB.tv	No	was $54M
16	27	Miami-Ft. Lauderdale	MLB.tv	No	was $49M
29	28	San Diego	MLB.tv	No	was $47M
32	29	Kansas City	MLB.tv	No	was $45M
36	30	Milwaukee	MLB.tv	No	was $33M

A couple of quick observations from this list:

• I think these links vastly under report the Dodgers’ actual revenues: they’re on an 25 year, $8.35B deal that averages $334M/year. Not sure why its only reported as $196M/year; maybe that’s after the 48% share?
• Same to a certain extent with especially the Yankees and Boston; there’s just no way Boston is “only” pulling $97M from NESN. They own 80% of the network and it had $574M in revenues last year.
• The two points above highlight the utter cynicism of MLB teams, at the same time, crying poor but then refusing to open their books. There’s only one “real” publicly traded team (Atlanta) and their finances are just fine: more than $600M in revenue last year with a payroll of $261M.
• That being said …
• Teams that own their own RSNs by and large are quite healthy, especially the Dodgers. The Dodgers have been taking every dollar of that massive amount of RSN revenue per year and throwing it at payroll, to the point of ridiculousness. Same for the Yankees and Mets famously. I’m not sure I really trust the revenue figures that these self-owned RSNs advertise (especially the $88M that the Mets supposedly get or the amount that the Cubs are pulling).
• I also have no idea how much Toronto gets, but I suspect its a massive figure as the sole Canadian team controlled by the group that has a monopoly of TV in that country.
• These healthy RSN revenue teams of course, also mostly benefit from being in the largest markets. NY, Chicago, LA, Philly. It remains to be seen what happens with Texas (in the 5th largest market) trying to make it a go with its own RSN.

However, the salient observation from above is easy to see: the smallest 10 teams in terms of historical RSN revenue have ALL seen their deals collapse in the last two years. They’re all now MLB.tv owned, joined by a smattering of slightly larger market teams. The only top-half market size team now in the MLB mix is Seattle, who interestingly decided to give up their own RSN because of some restrictive contracts with the local cable provider w/r/t local streaming options.

Tangent: DC is the 6th biggest DMA market, but was paid at the 17th highest rated team. I mean, I get it, these other markets have had decades to establish a fan and TV base for their teams … but this is one more illustration of how much the MASN deal screwed this franchise for decades.

So, what’s next? Well, first, we need to see what all these MLB.tv deals are going to pay. Something tells me that all these teams are going to take a massive haircut on the per-year revenue figures they were getting, even from failing RSNs. Do we really think the Nationals are gonna get $65M in shared fees and drip-drip streaming packages? Does anyone believe Seattle’s getting 9 figures? I don’t.

Next, we have the commissioner throwing a pretty major shot across the bow of the owners he supposedly represents by being on record saying he wants the broadcast rights for all 30 teams by 2028. But, what’s the incentive for these big market teams to do this? LA is in a deal that gives them an increasingly large amount of money until 2038. The Yankees are committed to their deal well into the 2030s. Toronto’s RSN has a monopoly in a country of 40M people; that’s twice the size of the NYC MSA. These wealthy teams aren’t just going to give up hundreds of millions of dollars so that Kansas City and Milwaukee can get more money. Oh, not for nothing, the 28th ranked media market out of the 30 teams? Frigging San Diego, who’s been running $200M payrolls for years … so something doesn’t add up when you have Miami and Minnesota and Cleveland crying poor.

Don’t get me wrong; I think in an ideal world where MLB could ‘start over” they’d nationalize TV deals, just as NFL/NBA/NHL have done. In a heartbeat. If MLB had what the NFL has, there’s be such a different competitive landscape. You can plunk a team in Green Bay or Podunk, Iowa and with a level playing field of TV revenue everyone can be competitive. But, I also recognize the current state of NY/LA/Chi markets and can’t quite come to terms with taking hundreds of millions of dollars out of the pockets of some teams so as to hand it to the (multi-millionaire) owners of smaller market teams, many of whom literally havn’t “tried” to win in years.

The last time we had a really significant work stoppage was in 1994, and a major reason behind that strike was internal battles between big and small market owners related to TV revenue sharing. They eventually agreed to partial revenue sharing, which still exists today (each team puts 48% of its RSN money into a big pot and re-distributes it equally), which but there’s been significant grumbling when the $110M or so of shared revenue gets handed to teams like Miami ($72M payroll in 2025) or Cleveland ($76M payroll) or even to Washington ($91M payroll last year) and they don’t even spend it all.

Now, in 2026 with LA making a mockery of the luxury tax cap with a projected $403M 40-man 2026 salary, fully $159M over the tax threshold and a slew of small-market owners losing their minds … something tells me we’re to going to see a massive issue this coming off-season. You have the commissioner running around telling players they “need” a salary cap (and guys like Bryce Harper telling him to get the f*ck out of their clubhouse), so the MLBPA is already girded for a massive salary cap fight … but Manfred also has to get his owners in alignment to be able to negotiate a common stance.

It’s “collective bargaining,” not “collective demanding,” and if the Owners want a hard cap, they’re going to have to “give up” something the players want in return … the question is, are they willing to give up enough to satisfy the players union? And, what could that possibly be? We alluded to it in the last column with the Skubal arbitration issue: would owners give up arbitration altogether, or let players go after 4 years to free agency, in return for a salary cap? Maybe. Would they agree to a salary floor to go along with the cap? That kind of has to be in there else we’re right in the same boat we are now.

And, all of this happening the year when half the teams in the league potentially face a franchise-altering loss of RSN money?

Not good.

You can make a pretty simple argument that, in the collective, MLB players in the sport are underpaid every year by hundreds of millions of dollars. The three other major sports in the USA all have union-league agreements that generally split revenues between the players and owners 50/50 or close to it. In fy2024, here’s what MLB’s macro financial situation looked like:

• MLB 2025 revenues: Not reported yet, but estimating a 9% increase over 2024’s $12.1B (call it $13.2)
• MLB 2025 opening day payroll: $4.9B
• MLB 2025 full Luxury Tax Payroll (incl all 40-man players and benefits): $6B

Assuming 2025’s revenues come in at the $13.2B level, players are getting just 45% of revenues, which is somewhere in the range of a $660M payroll gap to the 50% line. And this $500-$600M delta has been the case for years, for more than a decade frankly.

Why does MLB have such a massive payroll discrepancy? Well, a lot of it is due to the arbitration system. Teams have undergone the gradual replacement of near-replacement level mid-30s free agents with near-replacement level pre-arb players for years, for obvious reasons, while benefitting from (sometimes drastically) underpaid pre-arb and arbitration-age players. We have had some pretty famous examples in the past:

Mike Trout’s first three full-seasons in 2012-14 produced a Rookie of the Year, an MVP, two MVP runner-ups that probably would have all been actual 1st place votes if his team was competitive, three All Star appearances, 3 Silver sluggers … and total bWAR of 27.1. Total pay for those three years? A shade under $2M. Total. After a 10-win rookie season, the Angels increased his pay by the grand total of $27,500. For that $2M in payroll, Trout provided something in the range of $200-$240M in WAR value (at $8-$9M/war estimate frequently used).

Yet, now that Trout has signed a massive extension and has struggled with injuries, many call it an albatross of a contract and one the Angels never should have signed. They got allll that value for nearly nothing a decade ago, and now are on the hook for hundreds of millions as he plays out the string.

The message is pretty clear: the sport drastically underpays its younger stars, and then teams continue to fight to underpay them, and only the lucky ones can get a long-term deal deep into their 30s to “make up” for all that time being underpaid.

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Enter 2-time defending Cy Young winner Tarik Skubal, who couldn’t come to an agreement on 2026 salary in his last arb year prior to the deadline, and now has filed along with the team. He’s entering his last arbitration year coming off of his second straight dominant season, and has filed for $32M in salary. Meanwhile, Detroit has filed at $19M, a laughably low figure for the player based on his accomplishments in the last two years and what he’d command on the open market, but what they filed nonetheless. In case you weren’t sure just how sh*tty teams behave in this process, Detroit actually offered Skubal $19.8M as a salary figure… then took it back and filed at a figure $800k lower.

The two sides are set to argue this week in front of a 3-person panel.

Skubal’s salary in arbitration has gone from pre-arb figures to $2.65M in 2024, to $10.15M last year. Both of those figures were pre-hearing figures, settled upon by the teams. Skubal has filed a figure that would make him the highest ever pay determined by this system. but one that seems supported based on the current market conditions.

In theory, players should be getting roughly 40%, 60%, and 80% of their fair market value in their three arb years; one has to think Skubal would get a contract with a starting AAV much better than the Cole/Snell/deGrom range (all $36-$37M/year), and perhaps closer to the Scherzer/Verlander AAV range (both got $43M in their 2022-24 range contracts). 80% of $40M is exactly $32M, or exactly what Skubal filed for. I’m not entirely sure what Detroit’s arb team would argue for, if this went to a hearing … what possible criticism could you offer a two-time defending Cy Young champ? Odds are the two sides end up meeting in the middle somewhere, unless Skubal decides he wants to set a new precedent.

Here’s the larger issue that this case illustrates pretty clearly. Baseball has a major problem with paying for player value at the time that value is delivered. Skubal should be the highest paid pitcher in the league, right now, no argument. There’s no two ways about it. Trout should have been getting immediately paid at the top of the sport’s pay cycle after his first three seasons, and he shouldn’t be getting $35M/year in his decline years. But, because Trout was screwed for so long … the fact that he’s finally getting paid seems completely fair. This is a problem across the sport, where players are paid at pre-arb salaries for 3 years that are literally “assigned” by the teams, then kept artificially low for years more. Most players are between 29-31 before they finally hit the FA market … and now on the downside of their careers.

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How do you fix this? I’m not entirely sure. You need a system that gets players appropriate pay earlier in their careers, but doesn’t penalize them heavily if they get hurt. You want to give some security to players, but also to the teams. So, you’d have to be able to support all these questions:

• If you win the MVP as a rookie, do you jump from $750k/year to $40M/year? No, of course not.
• If you are earning $20M this year and tear your ACL on opening day, do you earn the MLB minimum the next year since you provided no value? No, that’s not feasible either.
• Should you be forced into three years of team-assigned payroll, this following sometimes 4-5 years of even lower team assigned payroll while in the minors? No, I think that’s clearly too long.
• Is the arb system too long? Do you eliminate it and make everyone a FA after 3 years? Well, no that’s probably too short for to be fair to teams.
• How about a restricted FA system like the NBA uses, where there’s a period where you can find other deals and your existing team can match them?

I dunno. I’m not sure what solution is on an individual player basis.

As for Skubal, something tells me they’ll settle pre-deadline, something in the $28M/year range. There’s no way Detroit wants to go to a hearing and criticize their best player to try to argue for a blatantly under-market deal. But, you never know. Teams have done weirder things in the past, especially when it comes to Boras-represented clients.

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Post publishing update: Skubal and the Tigers indeed went to the hearing, and Skubal won. His 2026 salary will be $32M, and he’ll be one of the 5-6 highest paid pitchers in the game. He sets a couple of new records:

• Highest Arbitration salary ever awarded (previous holder: Juan Soto $31M)
• Highest Pitcher Arbitration salary (previous holder: David Price $19.75M
• Highest year over year Arbitration raise of $22M (prevoius holder, Jacob deGrom $9.6M raise)

Interesting nugget in the story, quoting: “Scott Boras broke such precedent by filing at $32 million, citing a rarely-used clause in the CBA and arguing players with five years of service time can compare their contracts to any player in the game, not only contracts decided via arbitration. Skubal was thus able to invoke comparisons to the likes of Zack Wheeler, who earns $42 million annually via a contract extension he signed with the Philadelphia Phillies.”

If Detroit knew this was going to happen, i’m kind of surprised they didn’t push for a pre-hearing settlement. Because, there’s literally no argument against $32M/year when you’re comparing it to Wheeler’s $42M/year. Anyway. Maybe this is an impetus to drastically alter arbitration going forward in the next CBA. We’ll see.

It was just a couple weeks ago (January 9th to be exact) when Baseball America released its top 30 list for the Nats system. I reviewed it then in depth, as the first major pundit to release a top 30 rankings for our system.

So much has happened since that they had to update it.

Between the IFA signing period (where we spread around our $6M plus bonus pool on several highly-regarded prospects) and the Mackenzie Gore trade (which netted us five guys, four of which are now in our top 30), our top 30 now looks a bit different. Here’s where our new acquisitions slot into BA’s list, and who they pushed out at the bottom:

• New #5: Fien, Gavin, the star of the Gore trade. The $4.8M first round SS from last year will compete with our own $8.2M first round SS Willits for playing time in Fredericksburg this year. Though his size likely puts him immediately at 3B.
• New #9: Fitz-Gerald, Devin, the $900k 2024 SS will … also compete for playing time in Low-A this year.
• New #16: Rosario, Alejandro, the RHP pitcher who just had TJ and won’t pitch until spring 2027 at best.
• New #22: Cabrera, Yeremy*, the speedy 20-yr old CF with 43 steals last season.
• New #23: Serrano, Samil*, the headliner of our 2026 IFA class.

These 5 guys pushed down the formerly 26-30th ranked players:

• New #31: Alvarez, Andrew*, the under the radar lefty control arm who pitched really well in SSS last year in the majors.
• New #32: Glasser, Phillip*, our ML hitter of the year who got a NRI this season but who faces an uphill challenge for playing time.
• New #33: De La Cruz, Nauris, who signed for a pittance in the 2025 IFA class but who bashed the DSL last year.
• New #34: Cortesia, Brayan, who signed for a massive amount in the 2025 IFA class and who is higher on a lot of lists right now.
• New #35: McGarry, Griff, our Rule-5 pick whose pathway to being in the rotation just eased with the Gore trade.

Also newly acquired this month and presumably in the mix in this 30-40 range right now: our three other 7-figure signings from the 2026 IFA class (Suarez, Isalas, Ramirez, Angel#, and Duran, Juan) and the 5th prospect in the Gore trade Ortiz, Abimelec*, who sits 24th on MLBPipeline’s rankings right now and who might have an inside track to the starting 1B job in 2026.

I may have been critical of the Gore trade initially, but there’s a reason pundits mostly across the board liked it. These pundits may be overlooking the risk of the former Texas prospects, but the moves certainly strengthen the overall farm.

Now that we’re at the end of January, we should get ready for a ton of prospect content to come out soon. The next month should give us Keith Law, MLBPipeline, and Kiley McDaniel’s rankings. The last major pundit out there (Fangraphs/Longenhagen) has been pushing his ranks into the summer lately.

It’s been rumored all off-season, and now a few weeks before Pitchers and Catchers report, our biggest trade asset MacKenzie Gore has been traded. Announced last night, the Nats moved Gore to Texas for a package of 5 prospects.

Here’s a quick look at those 5 prospects, with their new Nats system rank and other pertinent information:

• shortstop Gavin Fien; 2025 1st rounder, Age 18. Our new #5 prospect (was Texas’ #2 prospect)
• right-hander Alejandro Rosario; 2023 college 5th rounder, Age 24, AA last year, new #11 prospect
• infielder Devin Fitz-Gerald: 2025 prep 5th rounder but over-slot bonus, age 20, new #12 prospect
• outfielder Yeremy Cabrera: 2022 IFA, just 20, our new #17 prospect
• first baseman/outfielder Abimelec Ortiz; 2021 NDFA, Age 3, on 40-man, hit AAA last year, new #24

First glance? I’m sorry, but is this all we could get? One 18yr old 1st rounder, two 20yr olds in low-A, a AA starter who missed all of 2025 AND just had TJ so he’s missing all of 2026 too, and a AAA utility guy? This is a major swing from a risk perspective, and the lack of additional higher-regarded prospects give me pause. The discovery (post publishing) that the 2nd best prospect is out for the entire 2026 season is even more demoralizing here.

I’m really disappointed with this return. We didn’t even get Texas’ best prospect in this deal. Maybe that’s me overvaluing Gore. On the one hand, Gore’s career numbers put him at a 98 ERA+. But at the same time, we’ve seen him be completely dominant for stretches. He’s valuable because he’s being paid a pittance for what he provides as a mid-rotation starter ($2.8M in first year Arb this year, $5.6M this year) and for 2 more years of control. He’s an innings eater who throws mid-90s from the left side; that’s worth a ton of the FA market and should have been worth more in trade.

When he didn’t go in the Winter Meetings, I thought the team should hold on to him until the Trade Deadline, when desperate teams who had lost starters to injury would be overpaying for mid-level starters. I was wrong; the new FO pulled the trigger on a deal they liked. I sense this was an underpay by Texas, but clearly the GM sees these younger guys and liked the deal.

An additional wrinkle: we’ve spoken before about the logjam of young shortstops projected to play in Fredericksburg in 2026 … well we just added two more guys who need playing time. We now add Fien and Fitz-Gerald to Willis, Feliz, Dickerson, and Mota, all of whom are likely projected to Low-A and who predominantly play SS.

What does this mean for the franchise? Insiders and those in the knew already knew this, but the signals have been strong that we’re on our way to bottoming out once again. My “casual Nats fan” pinged me last night with an immediate reaction to this trade, asking why we were getting rid of our best pitcher and I had to break it to him; we’re going to be bad for a while, so buckle up. This latter type of fan is the one who the Nats eventually will need to come back, to buy tickets, to bring the family for weekend games … but I sense a move like this, one which gets rid of one of the few players whose names they even know, is going to turn people off for a while.

I’m always excited to get more prospects into the system, as a prospect-heavy analysis site. Don’t get me wrong; can’t wait to do the spreadsheet work and try to noodle where I think these players will fit in my eventual top-100+ ranking that i’ll publish before the season starts. But I hate trading away assets and not getting enough in return, which I believe happened here.

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What do you think? Am I over-valuing Gore? Did we get appropriate return here? Should we have waited til the Trade deadline 2026?